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INCREASING  THE WORLD'S PER CAPITA FOOD  SUPPLY
Although  I do not believe  we  have  entered  a new era of food
scarcity,  increasing  hunger  and  malnutrition,  and  substantially
higher real farm and food prices,  I do believe that the United States
and the other industrial countries need to undertake  serious efforts
to  significantly  increase  per capita food supplies  in the developing
countries.  I believe this because it is both desirable and possible to
bring  about a much  more satisfactory food  supply situation for the
poorer people of the world.
A strong case can be made that the major barriers to significant
improvements  in the per capita food supply of the developing coun-
tries  are  political  in  nature.  The  barriers  are  not  primarily
economic,  except  as  economic  matters  affect  both  domestic  and
international  political decisions.  Neither are the barriers  scientific
in  nature; the productivity  of agricultural  scientists has been  fully
documented.  Nor are  the  barriers  due  to  the intractability,  igno-
rance, or laziness of the hundreds of millions of farmers  around the
world.  Quite the contrary.  If any of us found ourselves on a three-
acre  farm in India and had to feed ourselves and our families from
the output  of that  farm,  the  probability  of our  starving  would  be
high.  Most of the poor farmers of the world make very efficient  use
of their limited  resources.
There  are  four  major areas  in  which  primarily  political  deci-
sions  could  have  significant  impacts  upon the  world's  per capita
supply of food.  These areas  are:  (1) agricultural  research,  (2)  inter-
national trade  liberalization,  (3)  peace  in  the Middle  East,  and  (4)
reducing the birth  rate.
Agricultural  Research
No fundamental restraints in nature prevent a major increase in
food production  in the developing countries.  It was not nature that
created  the very  wide  gap  in grain  yields between  the developing
and the industrial countries over the past four decades.  Only four
decades  ago  average  grain yields  in  the developing  and the indus-
trial  world were  the same-about  1.15 tons  per hectare;  in  recent
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percent  greater than  in the rest of the world.
There  is enormous  discrepancy  in  the distribution  of income,
energy consumption, and food production among the nations of the
world.  One of the  most skewed  of the distributions is  seldom men-
tioned,  namely  the  distribution  of agricultural  research  effort.  In
the  mid-1960's  only  11  percent of the  world's  publicly  supported
agricultural  research  was  undertaken  in  Latin  America,  Africa,
and  Asia.
Agricultural  research  has  played  a major role  in  the  more than
doubling  of grain  yields  in  the  industrial  countries  over the  past
four  decades.  Obviously  many  other  factors  contributed  to  the
increased  yield-the  reduction  in  fertilizer  costs,  improved  pest
and disease  control,  and more  effective control  of weeds.  But for
all  of these changes  research  results  were  a necessary  condition.
Without  hybrid corn, for example,  lower cost fertilizer would have
had only  a modest  impact  on yields.
If we and the other industrial nations  are sincere about increas-
ing the food  supply in  the developing  countries,  we  will support a
major expansion  in  agricultural  research  in  the  developing  areas.
While  basic research of value to agriculture  can be done anywhere
in  the  world,  that  knowledge  must be  applied  primarily  in  the de-
veloping  countries  where  the food will  be produced.
The expenditures required  are not large.  Total expenditures on
publicly  supported  agricultural  research  in  1965  were  less  than  a
billion  dollars  for the  world;  private  research  relevant  to  agricul-
ture  was  almost  certainly  less  than  that.  What  is  required  is  a
long-term  commitment  by  the  United  States  and  other  industrial
countries  to  provide  support  for  agricultural  research  throughout
Africa,  Latin  America,  and  Asia.  At present  the  United  States
does not  seem  to  have  the capacity  to  provide  foreign  aid  on  an
annual basis,  let alone  make a commitment  for a decade.  We  want
quick results  and as  a consequence  we are  always disappointed.
The industrial  countries  could  assist agricultural  research  in  a
number  of multilateral  and bilateral  ways.  One  is through  regional
centers.  Much of the international  funding,  both  private  and pub-
lic,  of agricultural  research  now  appears  to  be going to  such  cen-
ters.  While regional centers are important  and can make significant
contributions,  national research  capabilities  have to be developed.
Such capabilities  are required  to adapt varieties to local conditions,
to  continue  the  fight  against  the predators  of nature-insects  and
disease,  to provide the capacity  for independent  discovery,  and to
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future.
If the industrial nations were to provide  $1 billion annually for a
decade  and  half  that  amount  for  the  subsequent  decade,  great
strides could be made to bring the benefits of agricultural  research
to all the major climatic zones of the developing world.  Additional
scientists need to be trained,  but the facilities for such training  are
readily available.
Creating  new  research  institutions  or  significantly  improving
the  productivity  of existing  institutions  is  no  simple  matter.  If  it
were,  the  world  would  have  more  highly  productive  agricultural
research  establishments  today.  Barriers  to  successful  public  re-
search  include  institutional  arrangements,  salary  scales,  political
imbalances and interferences,  and political instability, to mention a
few. Some of the efforts made would certainly  fail. But even if only
half  of the  attempts  succeeded,  the  evidence  on  the  returns  to
agricultural research  in the  developing countries indicates  that the
rate  of return  on  the  combined  successes  and  failures  would  be
significantly more  than  the current  rate.
If a  major  research  effort  is  undertaken  and  complementary
farm inputs are provided, there is no reason why grain yields in the
developing countries cannot equal the yields  in the industrial coun-
tries.  An  increase  in  grain  yield  of 0.1  ton per  hectare  in  the  de-
veloping  countries  would amount to 45  million  tons of grain annu-
ally.  To  provide  the  same  addition  to  food  supplies  by  food  aid
from the industrial countries would cost more than $5 billion annu-
ally, even if grain prices were  to decline substantially from current
levels.
International Trade Liberalization
Attention  is  not often  given  to the link between  the liberaliza-
tion  of international  trade  and  per capita food supplies  in the  de-
veloping  countries.  It  is  unfortunate  that the  role  of trade  in  in-
creasing  incomes  and food supplies  in the developing countries  is
so little understood. The industrial countries have gone a consider-
able  distance  in  removing  barriers  to  trade  in  industrial  products
produced  by other industrial countries,  but have been  most reluc-
tant to  lower the barriers  to their imports  of agricultural  products
and  labor-intensive  manufactured  products  from  the  developing
countries.  It  seems  rather  odd  that  although  gains  from  trade
among  industrial  countries  in  industrial  products  are  widely  ac-
knowledged,  little  progress  has been  made  in extending  the same
advantages  to  the  developing  countries  where  their  products  are
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industrial  countries.
The  present  round  of negotiations  under  the  General  Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade provides an opportunity for reducing the
barriers  to  trade  on  labor-intensive  industrial  products,  such  as
textiles,  and on  farm  products  that cannot  be  competitively  pro-
duced  in temperate  zones,  such  as sugar  and numerous  fruits and
vegetables.  At least 40 percent of the world's sugar is produced  in
the wrong places. The gains to the developing countries, especially
in Latin America,  from liberal trade in  sugar would be very large  in
terms of both  foreign  exchange  and more  productive  use of their
resources.
More  liberal trade  would  not necessarily  solve  the food  prob-
lems  of the  developing  countries.  For that  matter  no  one  single
change,  except  perhaps  for  a  rapid  and  drastic  decline  in  birth
rates,  can  make  a major contribution  to  per capita food  supplies.
But more  liberal trade  is  one measure  that  is essentially  costless,
after the resource  adjustments  are  made,  to those  who provide  it.
None of the other changes can  be  so described.
Peace  in the  Middle  East
A  stable  and durable  peace  in  the  Middle  East  could  make  a
significant contribution  to the food supplies of the developing coun-
tries.  Higher  yields  will  require  substantially  larger  amounts  of
fertilizer, especially nitrogen.  The lowest cost area in the world for
producing  nitrogen  fertilizer  is  in  the  Middle  East.  This area  has
enormous  reserves of natural gas that could  serve as  the base for a
large  fraction  of the  world's  output  of  nitrogen  fertilizer.  The
transportation  costs  of the  fertilizer to the  rest of Asia  would  be
less  than from the other major low-cost producing  areas.
Nitrogen  fertilizer  production  in  the  Middle  East  increased
significantly following the major developments  in the technology of
production in the mid-1960's.  However,  the unstable political situ-
ation has seriously inhibited the very large capital investments that
are  required.  If a  durable  peace  could  be  achieved,  such  invest-
ments  would  be  made,  and a  very  large  supply  of relatively  low-
cost nitrogen fertilizer would  become  available.
The nitrogen fertilizer would be produced at relatively  low cost
even  if the price of crude  oil remains  substantially  above the  1972
levels.  While some of the natural gas  supplies  of the Middle East
will  find  their  way  into  European  markets,  the  gas  would  likely
return  most  to  its  owners  by  being  transformed  into  a  finished
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the profitable  activities that peace would  make  possible.
There  are  those  who  point out  that  it  would  be  dangerous  to
concentrate  the  production  of  nitrogen  fertilizer  in  the  Middle
East. To do so, it is claimed, would only add an economic  weapon
in addition to crude oil that could be used in the future.  Perhaps so;
no one  can  say  that  such  would  not be the case.  But  we  live  in  a
world  in  which  many  risks  must  be  taken.  In  my  opinion,  the
benefits  to  the  developing  world  of a  substantial  increase  in  the
supply of nitrogen at relatively low cost is worth  the risk.  Increas-
ing grain yields  in the developing  countries  to the current  yields  in
the industrial countries-something  that must  be achieved  before
the  end  of this  century-will  require  enormous  amounts  of  fer-
tilizer.  A durable peace  in the Middle East is of great importance to
the poor  people of the world.
Reducing  the Birth Rate
The concern over the current rather precarious food situation in
the developing countries  should  not overshadow the food  produc-
tion gains  of the past two decades.  In  spite  of population growth
rates  in the  developing countries  of 2.1  percent  per annum in the
1950's  and  2.44  percent  in  the  1960's,  food  production  has  in-
creased  slightly  more than population.
But significant improvements  in per capita food supply can only
be achieved as birth  rates decline and the population growth rate is
reduced.  Unfortunately the United States and the other developed
countries can have a very limited role in either inducing or aiding in
efforts to reduce birth rates. As our own experience  shows, there is
strong opposition to a government taking an active role in reducing
birth rates.  And the opposition becomes solidified  if a case can be
made  that outsiders-cultural  imperialists-are  trying to  induce  a
country to engage  in a  positive  program.
Our  greatest  contributions  are  likely  to  be  in  maintaining  our
present  policy,  namely to undertake  research,  both  basic and  ap-
plied,  to improve contraceptive techniques,  and to provide  techni-
cal  assistance  when  requested  for  establishing  family  planning
programs.  We  should  emphasize  research  on contraceptive  tech-
niques  that  are  both  simple  and  cheap,  that  require  a  minimum
input by the medical profession,  and that can be made  available  in
the most remote village  in the world.
It is important that we use all available  means that can be used
quietly and without coercion to induce the developing countries to
face up to their population problems.  The subject  is a delicate  one
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produce enough food for 6 billion people by the end of this century,
it can  do little within that period to  significantly  improve the diets
of the poorer two-thirds of the world's population.  And no one can
guarantee  that total  food  production can  be  increased  by  2.5 per-
cent  annually  indefinitely.  It  is  a  matter  of prudence  that  major
barriers  to birth  rate  reductions  be eliminated.
FOOD AID
My previous comments have emphasized the political decisions
that could have some impact upon per capita  food supplies.  I have
not listed  food  aid  because  I do not  believe that  on  a  continuing
basis  it can  make  a  significant contribution  to  the per capita food
supplies of the developing countries. Such aid has two disincentive
effects-one  political and one economic. The political disincentive
is that reliance  on a continuing  stream of food aid permits  govern-
ments  to  give  agriculture  a  lower  priority  and  still  survive.  The
economic  disincentive is the effect  of food  aid, if substantial,  upon
local grain  prices.  Some of the price effects can  be mitigated if the
food  aid  is  used primarily  to  feed  disadvantaged  members  of the
population.  But even  in  this  case,  a  larger domestic  food  output
would  provide the  same  opportunity.
It is time for us  to  consider  economic  aid generally-not  food
aid as such except for emergency conditions.  By emergency condi-
tions  I  mean  the consequences  of natural  catastrophes.  We  have
had the  capacity  to deliver large amounts  of food to  most parts  of
the world in  a relatively short time.  This capacity  should be main-
tained.  This capacity,  and our generosity,  have  made the  world  a
little  more tolerable  for millions  of poor people.
The capacity  to meet emergency conditions  depends upon  two
things-the ability to move large quantities  of food quickly and the
availability  of reserves  adequate  for the  anticipated shortfalls  that
might occur.  At present there is a debate on a reserve policy for the
United States.  Until recently, the world had depended upon North
America for its food reserves.  Other nations gave little emphasis to
the maintenance  of reserves because  Canada and the United States
seemed  willing  to  subsidize  the  holding of very  large  reserves  of
grain-reserves  that  for  almost  a quarter  of a  century  were  ade-
quate  to meet world demand  and supply.  But  all this was changed
in  1973.
SOME NEW TRADE  ISSUES
Recent  developments  have  placed  some  new or at least rather
different trade  issues on the  agenda.  Among these issues  are  food
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supplies.  The  traditional  concern  in  international  economic  and
trade relations  has been  access to  markets by exporters.  After the
shocks  of the  past  two  years-our  embargo  on  soybeans  and
products,  the oil embargo,  export taxes imposed by the European
Community,  and the use  of state  marketing  agencies  in Australia
and Canada to limit exports-importing countries are now express-
ing concern about access to supplies upon which they may have to
depend.  The three  issues  are quite  interrelated.
Reserves  and Access  to  Supplies
The depletion of food reserves  in North America following the
reduced  world  grain  crop  in  1972  has  now  made  the  rest  of the
world  conscious  of the  important  role  taken  by  Canada  and  the
United  States  in  maintaining  relative  stability  of supplies  for the
previous  two  decades.  The  stocks  held  in North  America,  how-
ever,  were  not the  result  of a conscious  reserve  policy  but were
rather adjuncts of government  programs  to put a floor  under farm
prices.
Under the Agricultural Act of 1973 the United States is unlikely
to be an inadvertent  public storer of grains  during the next several
years.  If the  United  States  is  to have  government  grain stocks  it
will  be  only  as  a  result  of  a  deliberate  policy  decision.  The
minimum loan rates for wheat and feed grains  are sufficiently  low
that  the  government  is  unlikely  to  accumulate  any  significant
stocks.  Inflation may have also made  the target prices  sufficiently
low  in  real  terms  so  that  these  prices  are  unlikely  to  encourage
grain  output. This indicates that for the first  time  in three decades
our farm programs  are unlikely to be a source of large stocks above
what  would  be held  by  private  firms;  we  will have  to  go  into the
market to  acquire  them.
Certain dangers are present in any feasible program of reserves.
Farmers  quite  rightly  take  a  rather  jaundiced  view  of  the  net
benefits to them. Yet on balance there should be serious considera-
tion  of a  grain  reserve  program  designed  to  meet  the  emergency
needs of the developing countries and to provide greater stability of
supplies  for  regular  commercial  international  trade.  The  agricul-
tural policies of most of the industrial nations make  it unprofitable
for the  private  trade  to  hold  stocks  of grains  and feedstuffs  over
and beyond those required for working stocks. This is true for both
grain  importers  and  major  grain  exporters  such  as  Canada  and
Australia.
Thus  if the  holding of stocks for  commercial  exports  is  left  to
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the  United  States.  And  I can  see  no basis  for believing  that  the
private trade  in  the  United  States can accept the risks of holding
stocks for a large part of the world.  However,  I am not  in favor of
the United States and Canada returning to the pre-1972 position of
being the residual suppliers  of grain to the world.  If there are to be
grain reserves,  the importing nations should participate in holding a
significant  part  of the  total  and  paying  a  reasonable  share  of the
costs.
Thus  I see  no answer to the  problems of reasonable  stability of
supplies and access to  supplies except the negotiation  of an under-
standing concerning reserves of grains and storable feedstuffs.  I do
not  mean  that  reserves  should  be  held  internationally,  but  I  do
think that there should be an understanding of the joint responsibil-
ity of the  industrial  nations  to  contribute to  the world's  reserves.
Trade  in  farm  products  is  not  likely  to  be  liberalized  sig-
nificantly  unless  importing  nations  feel  assured  that  they  will
have  ready  access  to  supplies.  One  of the prices  we  will  have  to
pay for trade  liberalization  is the willingness  to  have stocks  larger
than  would  be  held  by  the  private  market.  This  assurance  was
largely  taken  for granted  through  1972  due  to  the  large  stocks  in
North America.  But now that these  stocks  have  been  greatly  re-
duced  and there is no automatic  mechanism for rebuilding them as
the  supply-demand  situation  eases,  some  steps  are  likely  to  be
required  to rebuild  the confidence  of importing nations.
I am disturbed  by the number of statements made by business-
men  and  politicians  that  the  United  States  should  maintain
sufficient  control  over  the  exports  of farm  products  to  prevent
"undue"  increases in prices as a result of a large increase  in foreign
demand.  Why politicians  make such  statements  is understandable,
but  I fail  to  comprehend  why  intelligent  and  successful  business-
men who have  lived  with  the numerous  controls of the past three
years  can  argue  that  the  solution  to  any  problem  of pricing  or
distribution  is to  be found  in government  control of exports.
Export  controls  are  counterproductive  in  at  least  two  ways.
First,  if  we  make  it  clear  that  if domestic  prices  should  rise  to
politically  unacceptable  levels we  will impose export controls,  we
will have  little chance  of achieving trade  liberalization  for agricul-
tural  products  in  the  current  round  of negotiations.  This  will not
only  harm the interests  of U.S.  agriculture  but  may also have  ad-
verse effects  upon the  developing countries.  Second,  the threat of
export controls will reduce to some  degree the incentive to expand
farm output  in the  United States.
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The  appropriate methods  of exporting agricultural  products  to
the  planned  economies  has emerged as  a new  trade issue for two
main reasons.  First, there is a rather general  view that much of the
drawdown of grain stocks and the large increases  in grain prices of
the  last  two  years  have  been due  to  the large  sale  to the  Soviet
Union and, second, the variability in grain production in the Soviet
Union  represents  a  large  share  of the  year-to-year  variability  in
world  grain  production.  There  is  a further  and more  fundamental
reason,  namely that the two largest planned economies,  the Soviet
Union and China, have a considerable degree of power to purchase
the entire  supply available in the grain markets.  This power repre-
sents  significant  problems  for the major  grain exporters,  not just
the United States with its emphasis upon private trade but also for
Australia and  Canada with their  state marketing  agencies.
I believe that agricultural exports to the planned economies  are
likely  to  be  an  important  element  in our agricultural  trade  for  a
number of years.  Sometime in the not too distant future the Soviet
Union may once  again enter world markets to purchase very large
quantities  of grains  and  feedstuffs.  We  could  try  to insulate  the
U.S.  market from these highly  variable purchases  by instituting  a
system of export controls.  Such  an  approach,  in  my opinion,  can
create  grave  dangers  for  both  farmers  and  the  structure  of our
marketing  system.
There  is an alternative approach  that would be  in the interests
of both the planned  economies  and the major exporters  of agricul-
tural  products.  This  approach  rests on  reaching  agreement  con-
cerning the sharing of information on matters relevant to potential
imports and exports.  A large part of the advantage of a single large
buyer consists  of a  monopoly  of information.  In  1972  the  Soviet
Union used its monopoly of information  and used it skillfully.  But
it is not now clear that secrecy is in the best interests of the Soviet
Union  since  any  seller  that  may  be  approached  becomes  suspi-
cious.
SOME  CONCLUDING  COMMENTS
The  politics  and  economics  of hunger are  very complex-too
complex  to be  handled  by suggesting  that each of us eat one  less
hamburger  per week.  It is  perhaps  an indication  of the temper of
the times that individuals  with relatively  high incomes  should sug-
gest reducing  hamburger  consumption,  even  as  an  illustration,  to
make more grain  available to the developing countries.  Most of the
individuals  in the group making the statement probably do not eat a
hamburger  per week. And it is  even more odd that reducing  ham-
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grain-the  major sources  of U.S.  hamburgers  are  imported  grass
fed beef from  Australia  and  discarded  cows  from  dairy  and  beef
herds.
While I am moderately optimistic that the world's food supplies
will  be  reasonably  adequate  for the  next few  years,  neither  I nor
anyone  else can foretell  if there  will be famine affecting  large num-
bers of people.  The present situation  is a precarious one.  Adverse
weather affecting agriculture in a significant area of the world could
result  in great distress in the  developing countries.  Just as I cannot
be  certain  that  food  supplies  will  be  adequate,  neither can  those
who  argue  the  contrary-that  there  will  be  a  major  dearth  of
food-be  any more certain of their position.  World  grain reserves
are  low, but  they  are not  lower relative  to production  than before
the  United States  and Canada  embarked  upon their  price-support
programs three  decades ago.
From  the  viewpoint  of the  developing  countries  the  present
food  situation  is  serious.  The  heavy  drain  on  foreign  exchange
earnings  due to relatively  high  energy and food  prices reduces  the
ability of developing  countries to meet  shortfalls  in their own food
production.  Yet  high  grain prices  are  not without  some  small  ad-
vantage to the developing countries.  It is only through  such prices
that  some  restraint has been imposed on meat consumption  in the
industrial  countries  and  thus  grain  has been  conserved  for direct
human consumption.
Until  grain  stocks  increase  some  it  is  imperative  that  no
artificial  restraints  should  be  placed  upon  increasing  agricultural
production  in  North America or throughout the world.  Expanding
production  is the  only short-run solution;  it is also one of the key-
stones  of a  long-run  solution  to  the  world's  food  problems.  The
other major keystone  is an  aggressive  effort  to reduce  population
growth.  However,  reductions  in the rate of population growth can
have  little  effect  within  a  decade.  But  waiting  will not  help.  The
time  to  do  something  is  now.
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